Paraguay’s Senate voted 44–0 to impeach President Santiago Peña after the collapse of Ueno Bank, ending a crisis that had centered on the lender’s handling of public funds and its reported solvency problems. Peña had sought a 72-hour delay and previously announced an intention to resign, but lawmakers continued the impeachment process; his lawyers challenged its speed and argued that it limited his defense.¹

Coverage from Brazil’s political right presents the outcome primarily as an institutional transition. Pedro Alliana, Peña’s vice president and a fellow member of the Colorado Party, assumes the presidency until August 2028 without an early election. The account notes that the Chamber of Deputies had rejected a separate impeachment request against Alliana by 48 votes to 30, clearing the succession path.² It also portrays him as an established Colorado Party figure who favors low taxes, foreign investment and socially conservative priorities.

Left-leaning coverage agrees on the central facts: the Senate’s unanimous vote, Peña’s failed resignation bid and the loss of the former president’s prospective status as a senator for life. But it puts the banking collapse—and the harm to Ueno’s roughly three million customers—at the center of the story. It reports that the Central Bank began advances to depositors after the intervention left many unable to access funds, while protests pressed for payment and accountability.³

The contrasting accounts also differ over the broader stakes. One stresses continuity inside the Colorado Party and Alliana’s legal mandate; the other describes Peña’s removal as a setback for South America’s political right and recalls Fernando Lugo’s 2012 impeachment as the only other such removal since the end of the dictatorship.⁴ Both, however, depict the Ueno Bank crisis as the immediate catalyst for an extraordinary transfer of power.