Story
Sep 25, 2026
Brazil Resists Regional Push to Label PCC and CV as Terrorist Groups
The Americas Shield coalition sees a shared terrorism designation as a way to tighten regional pressure on transnational criminal networks, while Brazil argues that its laws and anti-crime strategy require a different response. The dispute also reflects a wider divide over whether regional security cooperation should move toward military and treaty-based measures.
Fourteen Latin American and Caribbean governments joined the United States in an Americas Shield declaration targeting 24 transnational criminal groups, including Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV). The initiative envisages asset freezes, immigration and visa restrictions, and criminal liability for those who knowingly provide material support, subject to each country’s laws.1
Supporters present the designation as part of a more coordinated regional response to drug trafficking. The wider plan includes intelligence-sharing, security technology and training, coordinated financial sanctions, and a possible consultation at the Organization of American States under the Rio Treaty.2 On the Brazilian right, the decision has been cast as evidence that Brasília is being sidelined while neighboring governments embrace a tougher line. Commentator Paulo Figueiredo described the announcement as collective sanctions against PCC and CV while “the Lula government is left out.”
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Brazil’s government takes a different view. It does not classify PCC and CV as terrorist organizations because Brazilian law defines terrorism as acts driven by xenophobia or racial, ethnic or religious discrimination and intended to cause widespread social terror; the groups are instead treated as criminal organizations.4 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has argued for cooperation aimed at disrupting the flow of weapons and money, rather than foreign military intervention, while citing domestic operations and tougher anti-faction penalties.5
Officials in Brasília also see a broader risk in the coalition’s push toward the OAS and the Rio Treaty. According to that assessment, treating organized crime as a national-security issue could create a precedent for bringing matters such as critical minerals and Chinese involvement in infrastructure into the same security framework. The government plans to set out its own anti-crime measures at the OAS and expects the treaty consultations, still at an early stage, to have no immediate effect.6
The two sides agree that PCC and CV operate across borders and require international cooperation. Their disagreement is over the legal label—and whether it should open the door to a more militarized regional approach.