The United States and 14 Latin American and Caribbean governments have signed an Americas Shield declaration treating 24 transnational criminal organizations, including Brazil’s First Capital Command (PCC) and Red Command (CV), as narcoterrorist threats. The initiative envisages asset freezes, visa and immigration restrictions, and criminal liability for people knowingly providing material support, subject to each country’s laws.¹

Supporters of the declaration portray it as the first collective regional designation of this kind alongside Washington, coupled with intelligence-sharing, security technology, training and coordinated financial measures. The signatories also plan to seek a meeting at the Organization of American States under the Rio Treaty, potentially opening discussion of further collective action against the listed groups.

The two accounts agree on the central fact: Brazil did not join the coalition, despite the inclusion of two Brazilian organizations. The right-leaning account emphasizes that absence in the context of a US-backed initiative and says the measures will target not only members but also associates and supporters. A commentator likewise described the announcement as collective sanctions against PCC and CV while “the Lula government stays out.”Paulo Figueiredo (8) (pfigueiredo08)²

The left-leaning account places greater weight on Brazil’s legal rationale and on the wider scope of the US-led coalition. Under Brazilian law, terrorism is defined around acts motivated by xenophobia or discrimination based on race, color, ethnicity or religion, intended to create widespread social terror. Brazil’s Justice Ministry instead treats PCC and CV as criminal organizations.³

That distinction does not mean Brazil disputes the groups’ reach. The account says PCC has a recorded presence in 24 Brazilian states and CV in 22, with both maintaining connections beyond Brazil’s borders. But it frames the declaration as part of Washington’s broader diplomatic push, one that also covers critical-mineral supply chains, digital-infrastructure suppliers and multilateral coordination. Thus, both perspectives describe an expanding security partnership; they differ over whether Brazil’s absence is chiefly a political failure or a consequence of its statutory framework.