Под предлогом принудительного труда Трамп усиливает давление на Бразилию новой пошлиной в 12,5%

Управление торгового представителя США (USTR) предложило в среду (3) ввести дополнительную пошлину в размере 12,5% на бразильские товары.

The U.S. Office of the Trade Representative (USTR) proposed, this Wednesday (3), an additional 12.5% tariff on Brazilian products, alleging that Brazil fails to prohibit and inspect the import of goods produced with "forced labor." The measure, based on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, was announced a day after Secretary of State Marco Rubio classified Brazil as an "unfriendly" country in a Senate hearing on the State Department's budget for 2027, and adds to the proposed 25% tariff launched the day before for issues involving Pix, the Judiciary, and environmental policies. The final decision on the application of the surcharges rests with President Donald Trump.

The USTR concluded that 60 countries, including Brazil, failed to effectively enforce and inspect the prohibition of importing goods produced with forced labor, and proposed the application of additional tariffs of 12.5% on all products from these economies. The investigation was opened in March of this year and is based on the same Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 used to support the 25% proposal announced the day before. According to the official report, Brazil's conduct is classified as "irrational" and harmful to U.S. trade.

The U.S. government established two levels of penalty. Countries such as Canada, the European Union, Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Ecuador, which already have some partial prohibition or have formally committed to control rules, will face a 10% surcharge. Brazil is part of the broader group of 46 economies that, according to the USTR, do not have effective control regimes, alongside China, India, Japan, South Korea, Argentina, and the United Kingdom, among others, and therefore receive the higher rate of 12.5%. The argument is that the lack of oversight creates unfair competition for U.S. workers and companies.

"The failure of our trading partners to address the import of goods made with forced labor is unacceptable," said Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. "It forces American workers to compete on an uneven playing field."

The report acknowledges that Brazil makes commitments against slave labor in free trade and investment agreements, but concludes that these provisions "do not legally prohibit the import, for sale in the domestic market, of products manufactured in whole or in part with forced labor in other countries." The framing, however, places Brazil on the same level as countries without any formal commitment, which the Lula administration disputes.

The new tariff offensive was not isolated. Last Monday (1st), the USTR had already concluded another investigation under Section 301 and proposed a 25% surcharge on Brazilian products, citing as "unreasonable practices" the Judiciary's decisions on social networks, the Pix instant payment system, and policies to combat deforestation. The two investigations are proceeding in parallel, and it is not yet clear, according to available sources, whether the tariffs will be cumulative.

The diplomatic context is equally hostile. On Tuesday (2nd), Secretary of State Marco Rubio classified Brazil as an "unfriendly" country in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during a debate on the State Department's budget for 2027. Rubio listed the exceptions to Washington's coalition of allies in Latin America: Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and Brazil, adding that the country "is in the middle of an electoral cycle."

The mention of the Brazilian electoral calendar, made by the main U.S. diplomat in a formal Senate hearing, is not a mere protocol detail: it explicitly connects commercial pressure to Brazil's internal political dispute. The Lula administration refuted the accusations, stating that unilateral sanctions are disproportionate and threaten national sovereignty.

The measures are not yet in effect. The U.S. government has opened a public consultation period before any implementation, and the final decision on whether or not to apply the tariffs rests with President Donald Trump. Interested parties will be able to submit written contributions until July 6, 2026, and public hearings are scheduled for July 7. The deadline to request participation in the hearings ended on June 22.

For the textile sector, the USTR document provides for a special mechanism that will allow for a reduction in the tariff on certain volumes of U.S. apparel imports, calculated based on import and export flows between the countries involved. The operational details of this mechanism still depend on regulation. The Brazilian government, in turn, has until the end of the consultation period to present technical and political arguments against the proposal, a narrow window given the speed with which the American commercial offensive has advanced.

In a strong speech in Catalão, Goiás, this Tuesday (2nd), President Lula exposed the lobby of Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro (PL) with the Donald Trump administration, which resulted in a new tariff of 25% on Brazilian products, and stated that "these Bolsonaro children manage to be worse than him."

"Yesterday I learned the news that the American Commerce decided to tax Brazil by 25% when we were negotiating, when I had a meeting with President Trump. What do I want to say with this? That these Bolsonaro children manage to be worse than him. And they are, in fact, traitors to the homeland. They went to ask a foreign country to interfere in Brazilian decisions. This is what you have to say loud and clear: they are traitors," Lula fired.

The president once again compared Flávio Bolsonaro to Joaquim Silvério dos Reis, a traitor of the Minas Gerais conspirators, and called the opponent a "coward" for lying and denying that he asked for Trump's action against Brazil.

"For less than that, Joaquim Silvério dos Reis, who denounced Tiradentes, was hanged. What do traitors to the homeland who go to ask for a country's intervention in our country deserve? Think, meditate. Because this citizen today appears there in front saying: 'I didn't say anything, I didn't say anything'. All cowards are like that, they say the shit they say, then they don't have the courage to admit what they say, they try to lie," fired the president, who gave details of the negotiation with the Trump administration at the beginning of the speech.

Lula also said that no political group he has faced "has had the political sordidness that we see with this machine-gun family, which took over the government from 2018 to 2022."

"Today [Flávio] went to say he didn't say anything. He said it! He went to beg. He went to say: 'damn, Trump, hit Lula, attack Lula because Lula is going to win easily, hurt Lula'. Idiot. He doesn't know that he won't hurt Lula. He will hurt the Brazilian people. He will hurt Brazilian businessmen. He will hurt agribusiness," he stated.

The United States government formalized, on June 1, 2026, the conclusion of an investigation against Brazil conducted by the Office of the Trade Representative (USTR) and proposed the application of 25% tariffs on Brazilian goods, based on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

The measure, determined by order of President Donald Trump, classifies Brazilian policies ranging from the Pix system to Judiciary decisions on social networks as "unreasonable," and occurs days after Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ), his brother Eduardo Bolsonaro (PL-SP), and loyal follower Paulo Figueiredo met with Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington to push for sanctions against Brazilian institutions. The legal deadline for the U.S. to adopt definitive corrective measures expires on July 15, 2026.

The investigation had been opened on July 15, 2025, by direct order of Trump and is based on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a tool that allows the U.S. government to retaliate against countries whose practices are considered unfair or harmful to U.S. trade. The proposal still depends on the final decision of the U.S. president to take effect.

The tariff offensive did not arise in a vacuum. Between May 26 and 29, 2026, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ) was in Washington, where he met with President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. According to the representation filed with the Attorney General's Office by PSOL and Rede Sustentabilidade parliamentarians, the senator asked the U.S. government to classify PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations, in addition to having articulated pressure against the STF. The tariff proposal was announced by the USTR only three days after the end of the visit.

Paulo Figueiredo, a businessman who accompanied the Bolsonaro brothers to the meetings in Washington, confirmed to the press that he and Eduardo Bolsonaro advocated with the Trump administration for the application of sanctions against Minister Alexandre de Moraes based on the Magnitsky Act, a mechanism that provides for financial penalties and entry restrictions in the U.S. "I made this request in all the meetings we had," declared Figueiredo. According to him, Flávio Bolsonaro chose to "abstain" from this specific topic but participated in the meetings.

PSOL and Rede parliamentarians have alerted the PGR, requesting the opening of an inquiry to investigate the possible commission of the crime of "attack on national sovereignty," provided for in article 359-I of the Penal Code, and have requested an analysis from the TSE regarding possible foreign influence in the electoral process.

The selectivity of the American measure also generated criticism. The U.S. decision to classify PCC and CV as terrorist organizations completely ignored militias, paramilitary groups that have operated for decades in Rio de Janeiro and whose leaders have been honored by the Bolsonaro family. When he was a state deputy, Flávio Bolsonaro honored Adriano Magalhães da Nóbrega, a former police captain accused of leading one of the state's most violent militias. The omission of militias from the U.S. list reinforced suspicions about the political selectivity of the measure.